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Departure from the Guidelines: The
Frolic and Detour of the Circuits-How
the Circuit Courts are Undermining the




The question of the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' is now settled.' Courts are currently faced with questions
concerning the standard of review that will be used to determine if a
district judge's departure, either upward or downward, from a rec-
ommended Guideline was warranted and if so, whether the depar-
ture was "reasonable." 3 This author contends that the circuits are in
* Clinical Instructor and Adjunct Professor, Capital University Law School. B.A. 1979,
Cedarville College; J.D. 1984, Capital University Law School. The author wishes to express
special thanks for the efforts of Maria DelPizzo, a most capable research assistant.
I. Promulgated pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.SC. § 3551-3581
(1988). Throughout the text of this Article they will be referred to as the "Guidelines."
The Guidelines have only been in place since November 1987 and existing literature writ-
ten about them is scarce. Most articles deal with either the mechanics or constitutionality of
the Guidelines. See Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988); Schwender, Sentencing Guidelines for
Court Martial: Some Arguments Against Adoption, 20-50-188 ARMY LAW. 33 (1988); Wil-
kins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Depar-
tures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 181 (1988); Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult
Choices for the New Federal Sentencing Commission, 35 CATH. UL. REV. 181 (1985). See
also Clarke, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Update, THE CHAMPION Aug. 1988, at 16-18.
2. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
3. 18 U.S.CA. § 3742 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). This section provides, in part:
(e) Consideration.-Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall
determine whether the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sen-
tencing guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable,
having regard for-
(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence as set
forth in chapter 227 of this title; and
(B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence,
as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section
3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sen-
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disagreement regarding the proper standard of review to be applied
in analyzing departures, and have failed to develop any uniform sys-
tem of application. This Article discusses how several of those cir-
cuits are reviewing departures," specifically in the latitude of discre-
tion they are allowing district judges. The Article is not designed to
exhaust the rulings of the circuits' but to describe patterns that are
emerging, and to propose that if the intention of the Commission'
and the integrity of the Guidelines is to be maintained, a uniform
workable standard of review should be developed. The most pressing
question raised, however, is who is empowered to develop such a
tencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.
(f) Decision and disposition-If the court of appeals determines that the
sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand
the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the
court considers appropriate;
(2) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or
was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for its
conclusions and-
(A) if it determined that the sentence is too high and the ap-
peal has been filed under subsection (a), it shall set aside the sen-
tence and remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with
such instructions as the court considers appropriate;
(B) if it determines that the sentence is too low and the ap-
peal has been filed under subsection (b), it shall set aside the sen-
tence and remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with
such instructions as the court considers appropriate;
(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the
sentence.
4. The courts have dealt with two different kinds of departures: those under Guideline
Section 4a-Criminal History Category Departures-and those under section 5K-Offense
Level Departures. At the writing of this Article, the majority of the decisions dealing with
departures has been in the area of offense level departures. This Article's focus is primarily on
those section 5K departures, leaving the others to another work.
5. When this Article was first circulated for possible publication, there were approxi-
mately 10 cases in the various circuits dealing with departures. Almost every case dealt with
offense level departures and all but one was an upward departure. During the stage of final
drafting before printing, there have been over 40 cases on departures decided within the
months of November and December, 1989. After a review of these cases, I have included
several that are pertinent. I have also noted that the pattern of behavior by the courts of
appeals has not changed, but continues to obscure the intentions of the Commission and thwart
the goal of uniformity in sentencing.
6. Congress sought to achieve three main objectives through the creation of the Commis-
sion. The objectives represent.the fundamental purposes of the Commission: (1) to strengthen
the justice system and reduce crime by providing fair, just sentencing; (2) uniformity through
proportionality; and (3) honesty in sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing
Guidelines and Policy Statements, Apr. 13, 1987, at 1.2 [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines].
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES .
standard, since the United States Supreme Court seems reluctant to
hear the cases.
II. Determining a Guideline Range
The first step in developing a Guideline range is determining an
individual's criminal history category and offense level. By placing
these two numbers on a chart that lists the applicable ranges, the
Guideline range is determined.7
A. Offense Level
The offense level is controlled by Chapter 2, "Offense Con-
duct," 8 and Chapter 3 parts A, B, and C of the Guidelines. 9 The
Guidelines establish a framework for determining the offense level.
The following example illustrates a typical determination of an of-
fense level:
EXAMPLE:
X, a 34-year old drug dealer and user, robs a bank and
manages to get $40,000. During the hold-up, he used a semi-
automatic weapon and grabbed a teller, placing the weapon to
her head using her as a shield until he could get out of the
building. Investigations discovered that part of the proceeds
were used to buy a shipment of drugs. When caught, X pleads
guilty and agrees to testify truthfully, which he does during
debriefings.
X's record is: (1) X served eighteen months in prison on a
burglary conviction at age 22; and (2) he served three months
on a drunk driving charge at age 25.
(a) Section 2B3.1(a) provides that robbery carries a base of-
fense level of 18."0
(b) Section 2B3.1(b)(1) then adjusts this level by the amount of
money involved. For $40,000, the adjustment would be two levels,
for a total offense level of 20."
(c) Section 2B3.1(b)(2) then increases the level by four levels
for use of a firearm, thereby increasing the offense level to 24.12
(d) Section 2B3.1(b)(3) can further adjust for injury but not
7. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.2.
8. Id. at 2.1-2.120.
9. Id. at 3.1-3.5.
10. Id. at 2.17.
11. Id.
12. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2.17.
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more than nine points for both (2) and (3).13 In our fact pattern,
there is no adjustment, and the total remains at 24.
(e) Section 2B3.1(b)(4) allows for a four-point enlargement for
the abduction of the teller,"' creating a new total of 28.
(f) Section 3A1.3 contains adjustments that allow for a two-
point enhancement if the victim was restrained. 5 Here it is not ap-
plicable since it was already considered in the offense
characteristics.16
(g) Section 3El.1 provides for a two-point reduction for accept-
ance of responsibility,17 bringing X's total to 26.
Thus, after all of the offense level, victim-related, and accept-
ance of responsibility adjustments have been made, the adjusted of-
fense level is 26.
B. Criminal History Category
Chapter 4 of the Guidelines sets forth the procedure for deter-
mining an individual's Criminal History Category. This is done by
totalling the points that are provided for in section 4A.1. 18 In our
hypothetical, X, the defendant, gets three points for the imprison-
ment, and two more for the drunk driving charge, for a total of five
points. 9 According to the Sentencing Table, five points is a Criminal
History Category of 111.20 When a Criminal History Category III is
matched with an offense level of 26, the Guideline range is between
seventy-eight and ninety-seven months.21
I1. Departure from the Guidelines
A. Statutory Basis for Departure
The guideline range suggested in a presentence investigation re-
port does not bind a sentencing judge to that range. A judge may
choose to depart if there are mitigating or aggravating factors not
adequately considered by the applicable guideline.22 If no guideline
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.18.
15. Id. at 3.1.
16. The commentaries to § 3AI.3 suggest that an enhancement for victim restraint is
not applicable if the conduct was already considered in another section. Id. at 3.2. Section
2B3.1(b)(4) added four points for kidnapping. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 3.12.
18. Id. at 4.1.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.2.
21. See id. at 5.2 (chart).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) provides in part that a court may depart if it finds that
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
exists for the offense, a judge should then sentence giving "due re-
gard" for the Guidelines applicable to similar offenders and
offenses.23
If a sentencing judge departs from a guideline, a right of appeal
exists for the U.S. Attorney if the departure is downward 24 or for the
defendant if the departure is upward.25 If an appeal is taken based
on a departure, the statute provides that the standard of review is
one of reasonableness, and deference should be given to the sentenc-
ing judge unless the court of appeals finds the judge's departure to
be "clearly erroneous. '"20
B. Guideline Basis for Departure
2 7
Section 5K of the Guidelines deals with grounds for departure.
Section 5K2.0 21 contains a policy statement covering the grounds for
"an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consider-
ation ...and that should result in a sentence different from that described." See also 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 3552, 3553(d) (West Supp. 1989).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
24. Id. § 3742(b).
25. Id. § 3742(a).
26. Id. § 3742(d)(3).
27. See generally Weintraub, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Creative Departures, Ne-
gotiating Pleas, and Litigating Sentences, (pts. I & 2) THE CHAMPION May 1989, at 7-1 I,
June 1989, at 23-28.
28.
§5K2.0. General Provisions (Policy Statement)
Under 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence
outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds "that
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines."
Circumstances that may warrant departure from the guidelines pursuant to this
provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in
advance. The controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is
warranted can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing. Nonetheless,
the present section seeks to aid the court by identifying some of the factors that
the Commission has not been able to fully take into account in formulating pre-
cise guidelines. Any case may involve factors in addition to those identified that
have not been given adequate consideration by the Commission. Presence of any
such factor may warrant departure from the guidelines, under some circum-
stances, in the discretion of the sentencing judge. Similarly, the court may de-
part from the guidelines, even though the reason for departure is listed elsewhere
in the guidelines (e.g., as an adjustment or specific offense characteristic), if the
court determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guideline level at-
tached to that factor is inadequate.
Where the applicable guidelines, specific offense characteristics, and adjust-
ments do take into consideration a factor listed in this part, departure from the
guideline is warranted only if the factor. is present to a degree substantially in
excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense of conviction. Thus,
disruption of a governmental function, § 5K2.7, would have to be quite serious to
warrant departure from the guidelines when the offense of conviction is bribery
or obstruction of justice. When the offense of conviction is theft, however, and
when the theft caused disruption of a governmental function, departure from the
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departure and generally urges a sentencing court to depart only
when the guidelines do not adequately consider the nature of aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances that exist in a particular case.29
The court has discretion, according to the policy statement, but the
frequent exercise of that discretion is not encouraged apart from an
adequate consideration of factors that amount to "unusual
circumstances." 30
Guideline sections 5K2.1 through 5K2.14 list examples of rea-
sons for departure."' These are only examples, however, and are
neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Section 5K2.0 allows flexibility
when dealing with both guideline factors and departure factors.3"
C. Commentaries on Departure
In 1987, the Sentencing Commission disseminated commenta-
ries, the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements.33 Included in
the commentaries were a dissenting view of the Guidelines by Paul
H. Robinson 4 and comments on that dissent.3 5 The commentaries
applicable guideline more readily would be appropriate. Similarly, physical in-
jury would not warrant departure from the guidelines when the offense of con-
viction is robbery because the robbery guideline includes a specific sentence ad-
justment based on the extent of any injury. However, because the robbery
guideline does not deal with injury to more than one victim, departure would be
warranted if several persons were injured.
Also, a factor may be listed as a specific offense characteristic under one
guideline but not under all guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not
mean that there may not be circumstances when that factor would be relevant to
sentencing. For example, the use of a weapon has been listed as a specific offense
characteristic under many guidelines, but not under immigration violations.
Therefore, if a weapon is a relevant factor to sentencing for an immigration
violation, the court may depart for this reason.
Harms identified as a possible basis for departure from the guidelines
should be taken into account only when they are relevant to the offense of con-
viction, within the limitations set forth in §lBI.3.
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30-5.31.
29. Id. at 5.30.
30. These are circumstances that are "substantially in excess" of what is normally in-
volved in such a case. See id. at 5.30 (§ 5K2.0).
31. The reasons listed along with their Guideline subsection are as follows: 2.1 death;
2.2 physical injury; 2.3 extreme psychological injury; 2.4 abduction or unlawful restraint; 2.5
property damage or loss; 2.6 weapons and dangerous instrumentalities; 2.7 disruption of gov-
ernmental function; 2.8 extreme conduct; 2.9 criminal purpose; 2.10 victims conduct; 2.11
lesser harms; 2.12 coercion and duress; 2.13 diminished capacity; 2.14 public welfare. Id. at
5.31-5.35 (§§ 5K2.1-5K2.14).
32. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30.
33. See Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6.
34. Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sen-
tencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, May 1, 1987, in Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 6. Commissioner Robinson cited many reasons for his view of the fail-
ure of the Commission resulting primarily from what he called "a lack of serious and informed
deliberation and analysis." Among those faults he, almost prophetically, stated that:
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
were designed to interpret the Guidelines and assist the judiciary,
federal probation officers, U.S. Attorneys, and defense counsel in ap-
plying them to individual sentences. 36
The commentator's position is that departure is permitted but
not expected to happen in the normal course of sentencing. The
Guidelines adequately consider many mitigating or aggravating fac-
tors, and courts are expected to follow them. Only factors not "ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission""
are grounds for departure. According to the Commission, the Guide-
lines were designed to allow the courts to depart for good reason, but
the Guidelines presuppose that this will happen infrequently.
The Commission has adopted this departure policy for two
basic reasons. First is the difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a
single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.
The Commission also recognizes that in the initial set of guide-
lines it need not do so. The Commission is a permanent body,
empowered by law to write and rewrite guidelines, with progres-
sive changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts de-
part from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons
for doing so, the Commission, over time, will be able to create
The guidelines include so many invitations and directions to depart from the
guidelines, in even commonplace cases, that the "guidelines" are little more than
non-binding recommendations that are not likely to reduce disparity. Indeed, be-
cause the Parole Commission will no longer be adjusting the disparate sentences
imposed by judges-as it does now, albeit in an inadequate way-it is very pos-
sible that unwarranted disparity will increase under these guidelines.
For a summary of Commissioner Robinson's comments, see Summary of Dissent, at 2, in
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6. [Editor's Note: Although it may seem to be an anomaly,
Commissioner Robinson's dissenting statement--dated May 1, 1987--does appear in the Com-
mission's Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements-dated April 13, 1987.]
35. Preliminary Observations of the Commission on Commissioner Robinson's Dissent,
May I, 1987, in Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6.
36. The Commission's 1988 update on the Guidelines contains the following statement
on the significance of the Commentary to the Guidelines:
The Commentary that accompanies the guideline sections may serve a num-
ber of purposes. First, it may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be
applied. Failure to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect appli-
cation of the guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Second, the commentary may suggest circumstances
which, in the view of the Commission, may warrant departure from the guide-
lines. Such commentary is to be treated as the legal equivalent of a policy state-
ment. Finally, the commentary may provide background information, including
factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promul-
gation of the guideline. As with a policy statement, such commentary may pro-
vide guidance in assessing the reasonableness of any departure from the
guidelines.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, at 1.22 (§ IBI.7) (West 1988) (incorporat-
ing Guideline amendments effective June 15, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Guidelines Manual].
37. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30 (§ 5K2.0).
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more accurate guidelines that specify precisely where departures
should and should not be permitted.
Second, the Commission believes that despite the courts' le-
gal freedom to depart from the guidelines they will not do so
very often. This is because the guidelines, offense by offense,
seek to take account of those factors that the Commission's sen-
tencing data indicate make a significant difference in sentencing
at the present time.' 8
A careful review of the Guidelines, the policies underlying the
statutes, and the commentaries reveals the following:
1. When formulating the Guidelines, the Commission consid-
ered a wide variety of circumstances that have occurred in the past
and that might occur in the future. These typical circumstances form
the "heartland" 9 referred to in the Guidelines.
2. Courts are given the freedom to depart from a Guideline
specified sentence by exercising their discretion.'
3. Although this freedom to depart does exist, it should be used
only in cases when the factors considered significantly exceed those
adequately taken into account by the Commission. 1 Unusual and
atypical situations allow for departure.'
4. When a judge departs from the Guidelines, the departure will
be reviewed for its reasonableness and will be reversed only if clearly
erroneous.
43
IV. Appellate Review of Departures from the Guidelines
Among other things, Congress designated the Commission to
create a sentencing system that would foster uniformity throughout
the courts of appeal. Congress realized that this goal could be
reached only if courts apply the Guidelines in similar fashion, inter-
preting the language of the commentaries similarly, striving to reach
a consensus on the appropriate situations for departure from recom-
mended guidelines.
38. 1988 Guidelines Manual, supra note 36, at 1.7.
39. Id. at 1.6.
40. See id.
41. 18 US.C.A. § 3553(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). This statutory section provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind and within the range, referred
to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.
42. 1988 Guidelines Manual, supra note 36, at 1.6, 1.8.
43. Id. at 1.1 (Part A-Introduction and General Application Principles); 18 U.S.C. §
3742(e)(4) (1988).
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Trial court decisions have reached the courts of appeals in sev-
eral circuits, and patterns in the decisions are now emerging. These
patterns are not uniform: at the least they are diverse, and more
likely are in conflict with each other. Some courts of appeal are al-
lowing wide discretion, some are allowing no discretion, and others
are attempting to develop workable tests.
A. Wide Discretion and the Second Circuit
Two of the early cases on departure, United States v. Correa-
Vargas"' and United States v. Guerrero," are from the Second Cir-
cuit. In these cases the court established a standard of review that
allowed sentencing judges to exercise wide discretion in choosing
when to depart from a recommended sentence." Close analysis of
these cases reveals that "wide discretion" may mean unbridled dis-
cretion, in that this discretion gives a sentencing judge almost unlim-
ited opportunity for departure. The integrity of the Guidelines thus
becomes a secondary consideration.
In Correa-Vargas, the defendant was charged in a two-count
indictment with conspiracy to distribute4 7 and possession of co-
caine,4' but ultimately pled to a superceding information49 for using
a communication facility,50 a charge that carries a maximum prison
term of forty-eight months. 51 The applicable guideline in the case
recommended a sentence of from six to twelve months.52
Relying on the amount of cocaine involved as an aggravating
circumstance, the judge departed from the Guidelines and sentenced
the defendant to the maximum statutory term.53 The issue on appeal
was whether the judge used an impermissible factor in deciding to
44. 860 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
45. 863 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1988).
46. See id. at 251; United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1988).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1966); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2) (1982).
49. An individual may execute a valid waiver of indictment on any crime not punishable
by death and, upon agreement, a defendant can enter into a plea bargain and choose to pro-
ceed by information. There is no essential difference between an information and an indict-
ment. They are both, except for the signature, precisely in the same form, serve the same
purpose, and have the same consequence. See FED, R. CRIM. P. 7; Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87 (1974); Bartlett v, United States, 354 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
945 (1966); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1982).
51. United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
52. Correa-Vargas accepted responsibility for the crime and received a two-point reduc-
tion (§ 2DI.6), giving him a base offense level of 10, which coupled with a criminal history
category of I resulted in the guideline range. See id. at 36 n.l.
53. Id. at 36.
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depart. 54 Quantity is not an aggravating factor in section 2D1.6 55
the Guideline section used to arrive at the offense level.
The Second Circuit upheld the judge's departure and cited lan-
guage in the Guideline commentaries56 that seems to indicate that
departure can be based on factors that are not included in the
Guidelines.57 The Second Circuit concluded, "Consistent with this
approach, there is no place in the Guidelines where the Commission
states that it has rejected quantity as a factor in sentencing tele-
phonecount offenders. '58 The court then stated that "the most ap-
plicable policy statement in the guidelines also gives a district court
wide discretion in determining which circumstances to take into ac-
count in departing from the guidelines.
'59
Upon closer examination, the policy statement of section 5K2.0,
to which the court referred, provides that "[tihe controlling decision
as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted can only be
made by the court at the time of sentencing." 60 As the discussion
below will demonstrate, however, this quote is taken out of a larger
context. Other pertinent parts of the Commission's policy statement
confirm that the commissioners did not intend to allow wide discre-
tion as the Second Circuit defines that concept.Rl
In Correa-Vargas, the court essentially ignored the Guideline
directives of departing for "unusual circumstances," ' "not very
54. Id.
55. Section 2D1.6 contains no adjustments and provides no commentary that relates any
offense characteristic to the process of arriving at a base offense level. Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 6, at 2.40. Compare that to § 2D1.5, which has three potential base offense levels
that are dependent on the substance possessed, id. at 2.43, and § 2DI.I, in which the base
offense level depends on the quantity of drugs that were possessed. Id. at 2.32-2.38.
56. The language cited from § 5K2.0 of the commentaries is as follows:
Also, a factor may be listed as a specific offense characteristic under one
guideline but not under all guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not
mean that there may not be circumstances when that factor would be relevant to
sentencing. For example, the use of a weapon has been listed as a specific offense
characteristic under many guidelines, but not under immigration violations.
Therefore, if a weapon is a relevant factor to sentencing for an immigration
violation, the court may depart for this reason.
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30-5.31.
57. United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1988).
58. Id. at 37.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30-5.31 (§ 5K2.0--General Provisions
(Policy Statement)).
61. This court seems to ignore the Commission's emphasis on helping judges to identify
both factors not "fully" considered and "unusual circumstance." It is clear from the larger
context of this section that Commission consideration of any factors must be inadequate to
warrant departures. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.36, 5.37 (§ 5K2.0--Grounds for
Departure (Policy Statement)).
62. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30-5.31 (§ 5K2.0-General Provisions
(Policy Statement)).
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often," 3 and only when the factors substantially outweigh those fac-
tors already considered by the Commission."' The Second Circuit's
approach is that if the Commission wishes to preclude departure in
any given area, it will limit the discretion. The court's approach
seems to assume that any factor not specifically addressed in the
commentaries may be used by a judge in exercising his or her
"sound judgment"6 5 and "sensible flexibility."'6 I
In December of 1988, the same court was faced with another
upward departure case in United States v. Guerrero.17 In Guerrero,
the indictment charged the defendant with two counts of conspiracy
to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, and, in a third count, with
distributing an unspecified amount of a Schedule I Narcotic, which
also turned out to be heroin. 8 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Guer-
rero pled guilty to the third count with no agreement in the bargain
regarding the ultimate sentence.6 9 There was an agreement with the
prosecutor, however, that the defendant should receive a two-point
reduction in his offense level for remorse,70 and a two-point reduction
for minor participation in the crime.71
The government and the defendant stipulated to the facts that
would be used by the court and the probation department for Guide-
line calculation and sentencing:
The stipulation disclosed that Guerrero had held a series of
conversations with the informant in which arrangements were
made to have Guerrero introduce the informant to a potential
supplier of heroin and to have the informant pick up from Guer-
rero a sample of heroin furnished by the supplier. Guerrero also
acknowledged that he knew the informant intended to buy an
additional quantity of heroin from the supplier. Finally, Guer-
rero admitted that he introduced Rivera to the informant on De-
cember 9 and remained present during a conversation in which
the informant and Rivera negotiated a sale of heroin. The sale,
63. Id. at 1.6 (Chapter one, Part A(4)(b) on departures).
64. Id. at 5.30-5.31 (§ 5K2.0-General Provisions (Policy Statement)).
65. United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988).
66. Id.
67. 863 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 246.
69. Id.
70. Section 3EI.I(A) of the Guidelines, which deals with acceptance of responsibility,
provides as follows: "If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmation of
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels."
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 3.12.
71. Section 3B1.2(a) of the Guidelines provides: "If the defendant was a minor partici-
pant in any criminal activity, decrease [the offense level] by 2 levels." Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 6, at 3.3.
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made on December 11, involved 698 grams of heroin."
Even with these stipulated facts and the agreement regarding
point reductions during sentencing, there was an argument regarding
the appropriate base offense level. The defendant contended that
since he had only been convicted of one sale of a three-gram sample,
the appropriate base offense level was 12, according to section
2D1.1.T An additional two-point discount for acceptance of respon-
sibility74 would make the defendant's base offense level a 10.7  An
offense level 10 coupled with a criminal history category of I results
in a six to twelve month guideline range. 6
The prosecution and probation officers, however, urged the court
to calculate the base offense level based upon the overall quantity of
heroin involved, 698 grams.7 7 This would be a level 28,78 and with
the four-point reduction promised, would create a guideline range of
fifty-one to sixty-three months.79
The lower court judge accepted the defendant's version, but de-
parted upward, sentencing the defendant to sixty-five months and a
$200,000 fine.80 The Second Circuit stated that the sentencing judge
should have used a base offense level of 28 with a four-point
reduction.81
The court, citing Correa-Vargas, concluded that the upward de-
parture was reasonable, especially since the sentencing judge chose
the lower guidelines.82 The court of appeals indicated that if the sen-
tencing judge had applied a higher Guideline range, it might have
been unreasonable to consider the quantity of the subsequent sale as
a reason for departure.83
The court's use of drug quantity as a factor in determining the
72. United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1988). The sample was three
grams. Id. at 247.
73. Section 2DI.l. of the Guidelines provides that if the amount of drugs involved is less
than five grams of heroin, the offense level is 12. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2.39;
see United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1988).
74. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 3.12 (§ 3El.l(a)).
75. Defendant forfeited an additional two-point reduction since he pled guilty only to the
count involving three grams. Id. at 5.2 (Chapter 5, Part A (Sentencing Table)); see Guerrero,
863 F.2d at 247.
76. Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 246-47.
77. United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1988).
78. Four hundred to 699 grams of heroin is an offense level of 28. Sentencing Guide-
lines, supra note 6, at 2.38 (§ 2DI.1); see Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 247.
79. Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 247.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 250.
82. United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 250-51.
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reasonableness of departure was not necessarily flawed just because
the Guidelines had already considered quantity in setting the offense
level. Clearly, scores may be adjusted based upon the unusual grav-
ity of the offense,8 ' and the excess amount in this case was consid-
ered. Rather, the problem with the Second Circuit's approach is that
there was no analysis of whether the aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances were significantly in excess of those considered by the
Commission, or if the circumstances were unusual or atypical. As it
had in Correa-Vargas, the court of appeals in Guerrero simply de-
ferred to the sentencing court's ultimate judgment and paid only lip
service to the Guidelines.
The Second Circuit continued to promulgate this wide discre-
tion standard in United States v. Sturgis.85 The defendant in this
case was charged with committing two bank robberies. 86 The proba-
tion department recommended a departure upward from the Guide-
lines due to an inadequate criminal history category87 that did not
consider two important factors. First, the defendant previously pled
guilty to two state felonies, but had never been sentenced. 8 Second,
the defendant had committed these two bank robberies while on bail
awaiting sentencing for the two prior felonies. 89 Based upon those
factors, the district court gave the defendant a criminal history Cate-
gory V and sentenced him to sixty months in prison.90
The court of appeals' analysis of this departure relied heavily
upon the wide discretion standard from 'Correa-Vargas and Guer-
84. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
85. 869 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1989).
86. Id. at 55.
87. Section 4A1.3 of the Guidelines provides: "If reliable information indicates that the
criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past
criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may
consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range." Sen-
tencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4.6.
88. United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. Id. at 55-56. Section 4AI.3(d) of the Guidelines provides:
If reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not
adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the
likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider
imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range.
Such information may include, but is not limited to, information concerning:
(d) whether the defendant was pending trial, sentencing, or appeal on an-
other charge at the time of the instant offense.
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4.7 (§ 4AI.3: Adequacy of Criminal History Category
(Policy Statement)).
90. Sturgis, 869 F.2d at 56. The sentence is within the Category V range (57-71
months), but is outside the Category Ill range (37-46 months). See Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 6, at 5.2.
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rero.91 The court also repeatedly cited 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B),
stating that the purpose of the Guidelines is to avoid "unwarranted
sentencing disparity" '92 among similarly situated defendants. This
statement indicates that the court disapproves of unwarranted depar-
tures. At the same time, however, the court contended that each
judge must exercise his or her own sound judgment and may do so
with discretion.93
Although this departure may be an example of a justified devia-
tion from the recommended Guideline, the court upheld it without
adequate consideration of the Guideline commentaries or meaningful
analysis as to how this defendant's criminal history category "signifi-
cantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further
crimes."94 This approach was used by the Second Circuit in each of
the three cases noted above and provides almost unlimited departure
possibilities.
It is interesting to note that in United States v. Paulino95 the
Second Circuit used a different standard when analyzing whether or
not a judge could or should depart downward. In Paulino, the court
articulated a standard not in terms of wide discretion, but in terms
of Guideline considerations.96 Compare the following with the for-
mer notions of wide discretion and sound judgment:
The decision to depart is a matter within the sound discre-
tion of the sentencing judge. See Sentencing Guidelines ch. 5,
pt. K, § 2 General Provisions (Policy Statement), at p. 5.30
("The controlling decision as to whether and to what extent de-
parture is warranted can only be made by the court at the time
of sentencing."); United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35,
40 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d
54, 56 (2d Cir. 1989). Moreover, Congress expected that that
broad discretion would be exercised only when the basis for de-
parture was a circumstance not already factored into the Guide-
lines: "The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within
the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
91. Sturgis, 869 F.2d at 56-57.
92. Id. at 56-57. See also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1987).
93. United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4.7 (§ 4A1.3(e)).
95. 873 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 25.
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.. . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1988). Here, Paul-
ino suggests as bases for departure two factors, minimal role and
insubstantial criminal record, both of which were explicitly con-
sidered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines and
were taken into account by the District Court in its guideline
calculation. Under such circumstances, a decision not to depart
from the applicable guideline range cannot possibly be in excess
of the discretion confided in sentencing judges .... 97
In light of past Second Circuit cases, sound judgment and wide
discretion again seem to mean that the judge is autonomous unless
the Guidelines expressly and specifically forbid departure. The
court's reference to the integrity of the Guidelines is quite meaning-
less considering the latitude it allows, and its reference to "broad
discretion"98 is incongruous considering how the court defined and
applied "wide discretion."99
Appellate courts use this wide discretion standard when review-
ing a lower court's decision on evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.100 In such cases, appellate courts
have given great deference to lower courts, and will only reverse a
ruling when there is an abuse of discretion.10 1
In departure cases, however, the Second Circuit has given wide
discretion to lower courts who only must be reasonable under the
Guideline standard. The primary difference is that a judge making
an evidentiary ruling has seen and heard the presentation and is
charged with making a ruling. In contrast, when a judge sets a sen-
tence outside recommended Guidelines, he or she is not the sole
determinor of the applicable criteria-the Commission's determina-
tions also must be considered. The reason the standard is mere rea-
sonableness, therefore, is because the Guidelines, unlike the rules of
evidence, afford very little latitude in decisionmaking. It is inappro-
priate, therefore, to give the same latitude of discretion for both evi-
dentiary rulings and departure decisions. Broad discretion as defined
in the Guideline commentaries hardly resembles the Second Circuit
standard.
Most recently the Second Circuit decided United States v.




100. FED. R. EvID. 403.
101. See, e.g., Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1983).
102. 891 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1989).
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departure from both the criminal history category and the offense
level. 103 The lower court gave three reasons for the departure: (1) a
pattern of robberies, specifically the short amount of time between
the robberies; (2) the defendant's representation to bank personnel
that he had a gun when in fact he did not; and (3) the need to
protect society from a continuation of the previous pattern of behav-
ior of the defendant.
104
The court of appeals-in detail foreign to its decisions in Guer-
rero and Correa-Vargas-analyzed each stated reason for departure,
giving great deference to the Guideline considerations.10 5 The court
even went so far as to conjecture what evidence the commissioners
must have considered when formulating certain Guidelines. 0" In
each case the conclusion was that the Commission had already ade-
quately considered the factor the lower court used to depart.0 '
The most interesting feature of the opinion, however, is what it
omitted. There is no reference to Guerrero, Correa-Vargas, or wide
discretion anywhere in the consideration of departing from the of-
fense level. The court based its determination solely upon Guideline
policy and Commission commentaries. This strikingly different ap-
proach demonstrates this circuit's lack of concern for proper Guide-
line implementation and suggests an intra-circuit conflict.
B. Broad Discretion and the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit grappled with the departure issue in United
States v. Roberson."8 Eddie Wayne Roberson was indicted for
credit card fraud. 10 9 Since the facts giving rise to this charge were
not typical of those involved in similar cases, it is worthwhile to pre-
sent them in some detail.
While he was on parole, Roberson met and befriended an
eighty-year old alcoholic, Jack Doherty." Roberson lived with Do-
herty, who gave him room and board in exchange for assisting the
elderly man with his household duties, taking him to the doctor, and
doing the shopping." One night when Doherty was drunk, he had a
coughing fit and became unconscious after he fell and struck his
103. Id. at 404-14.
104. Id. at 408.
105. Id. at 408-14.
106. Id. at 410-12.
107. United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 410-12 (2d Cir. 1989).
108. 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 175 (1989).
109. Id. at 598.
110. Id. at 599.
I11. Id.
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head on a table.112 Unable to detect a pulse or breathing, Roberson
immediately fled the scene, fearing accusations of murder.11 3 He re-
turned home later and found Doherty dead. 14 He wrapped Doherty
up in a quilt and cleaned the house in order to conceal the incident.
Roberson then placed the body in the back of Doherty's car, and
drove around Texas for several days with the body in the car."
Eventually, Roberson burned the body beyond recognition.116 During
his travels, he used Doherty's credit cards to buy food and gas and to
rent rooms. 17 He also flew to Kansas city on the card and later re-
turned to Texas. Roberson spent approximately $6700 on the credit
card."8
The state was never able to charge Roberson with more than
abuse of a corpse, a charge on which he had not been tried at the
time of the federal indictment on charges of credit card fraud. 19
During the sentencing phase, the court was presented with a Guide-
line range of thirty to thirty-seven months, based upon an offense
level of 12 and a criminal history category of VI. 2° The judge chose
to depart and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The court relied on
extreme conduct as a justification for departure, citing section 5K2.8
of the Guidelines.
1 21
The Fifth Circuit analysis, as well as the sentencing court's rea-
soning, involved a diligent search of the Guidelines. The court found
extreme circumstances beyond those contemplated by the Guidelines
and found the departure reasonable.
122
One issue that arose was the defendant's insistence that a sec-
tion 5K2.8 departure is only to be considered when the extreme of-
fense conduct against the victim relates to the charges in the indict-
ment.1 23 In other words, when the conduct against the victim is not
112. Id.






118. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 599 (5th Cir.), cert. aenied, 110 S. Ct.
175 (1989).
119. Id. at 599-600.
120. Id. at 600.
121. The court stated that "Roberson's conduct is the type of 'extreme conduct' justify-
ing departure from the Guidelines . . . . '§ 5K2.8 provides that the court may depart from the
guidelines if the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the
victim.'" Id. at 602.
122. See supra note 121.
123. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
175 (1989).
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involved in the offense charged, section 5K2.8 does not apply. The
court concluded that such an interpretation is too narrow and would
preclude statutory maximum sentencing.
124
This issue is closely related to discretion, and the Fifth Circuit
indicated that the sentencing court has broad discretion. The Rober-
son court's definition of "broad" is the same as the Guidelines' defi-
nition of that term, and the court went to great lengths to adhere to
the Guideline definition of the term.125 Quite unlike the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis, the Fifth Circuit's use of "broad" included the princi-
ple that "Congress limited the resources which the district court may
use to determine whether the Commission has given adequate con-
sideration to a factor, instructing that a sentencing court shall con-
sider only the guidelines, the policy statements, and the official com-
mentary of the Commission."' 26
C. Tests from the First and Sixth Circuits
The First Circuit developed a three part test in United States v.
Diaz-Villafane:
2 7
We have yet to limit the standards of review applicable to
departures from the Guidelines. We do so today. The process, as
we see it, comprises three steps.
First, we assay the circumstances relied on by the district
court in determining the case is sufficiently "unusual" to war-
rant departure. That review is essentially plenary: whether or
not circumstances are of a kind or degree that they may appro-
priately be relied upon to justify departure is, we think, a ques-
tion of law.
Second, we determine whether the circumstances, if concep-
tually proper, actually exist in the particular case. That assess-
ment involves factfinding and the trier's determinations may be
set aside only for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d).
Third, once we have assured ourselves that the sentencing
court considered circumstances appropriate to the departure
equation and that those factors enjoyed adequate record support,
the direction and degree of departure must, on appeal, be mea-
sured by a standard of reasonableness. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(2)
128
124. Id. at 605-06.
125. Id. at 604-05.
126. Id. at 602. As discussed below, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar notion of
broad discretion at least in name, but without the underpinnings of the Commission commen-
taries and policy statements. See infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
127. 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177 (1989). It is interesting to note
that one of the three judges on the opinion was a member of the Sentencing Commission.
128. Id. at 49.
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The third prong of this test is really nothing more than a re-
statement of 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which contains the reasonableness
standard. Later in the opinion, however, the court attempted to clar-
ify the meaning of the third part of the test:
This third step involves what is quintessentially a judgment
call. District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-
blood defendants. The dynamics of the situation may be difficult
to gauge from the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record.
Therefore, appellate review must occur with full awareness of,
and respect for, the trier's superior "feel" for the case. We will
not lightly disturb decisions to depart or not, or related decisions
implicating degrees of departure.1 "'
Although the court never explained steps one and two, it is not
difficult to understand what the First Circuit did. The court rewrote
the statutes, Guidelines, and policy statements into a test. But will it
work?
For example, the court considered the first part of the test to
contain a question of law. 130 In contrast, the Guidelines' policy state-
ments make that decision a factual matter to be determined by the
sentencing judge. 1 ' The sentencing court is to look for the atypical,
the unusual, and factors that are significantly different from those
already considered by the applicable Guidelines. Such a considera-
tion will always involve the judgment call of the factfinder. As a
legal matter, these standards are settled. From a factual standpoint,
however, they must be decided in each case.
The second part of the Diaz-Villafane test, like part one, ques-
tioned whether the factors under consideration depart from the
heartland'32 carved out by the Commission. After analyzing this test
one is left with the same questions the test attempts to answer: when
is a departure warranted, and what departures are reasonable? The
court's attempt to transform a factual finding into a legal standard
does nothing more than restate the Guidelines. In effect, part two
contains no test at all.
The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar approach in United States
129. Id. at 49-50.
130. See text accompanying supra note 128.
131. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30-5.31 (§ 5K20-Grounds for Depar-
ture (Policy Statement)).
132. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
177 (1989).
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v. Rodriguez,3 3 relying on the First Circuit's test in Diaz-Vil-
lafanels' and United States v. Velasquez-Mercado.l3 5 In applying
this test, the Rodriguez court upheld the sentencing judge's reliance
(1) upon a foreign conviction;" 8' (2) upon a finding that the defend-
ant had the propensity to commit crimes in the future; 37 and (3)
upon a finding that the defendant had survived through criminal ac-
tivity since entering the United States." 8' Based on these factors, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the sentence was not unreasonable. Ad-
ditionally, the court noted that sentencing courts have broad discre-
tion as defined by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Roberson1
3 9
and the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sailes.140 The broad discre-
tion standard as defined in Roberson, however, is not inconsistent
with maintaining uniformity and considering the factors already con-
sidered by the Guidelines. In Roberson, the Fifth Circuit noted that
the Guidelines circumscribe a court's discretion but do not eliminate
it. 4 According to Fifth Circuit, the court's discretion is broad, but
broad is defined in terms of the Commission's policy:
The new sentencing statute permits a court to depart from
a guideline-specified sentence only when it finds an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance that was not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission. . . . 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b). Thus, in principle, the Commission, by specifying that
it had adequately considered a particular factor, could prevent a
court from using it as grounds for departure. In this initial set of
guidelines, however, the Commission does not so limit the
courts' departure powers. The Commission intends the sentenc-
ing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a
set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline
describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a
particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct sig-
nificantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether
a departure is warranted.
4 2
133. 882 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1144 (1990).
134. 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177 (1989).
135. 872 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 187 (1989).
136. United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1067 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1144 (1990).
137. Id. at 1067-68.
138. Id. at 1068.
139. 872 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 175 (1989).
140. 872 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1989).
141. Roberson, 872 F.2d at 601.
142. Id. at 601 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 6, at 1.5 (Resolution of Major Issues));
see also Guidelines, supra note 6, at 5.30 (§ 5K2.0-General Provisions (Policy Statement)).
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This language is important since the Sixth Circuit in Rodriguez
cited both Roberson and the Second Circuit's Correa-Vargas as sup-
port for its method of departure." 3 The problem is that the Fifth
Circuit's broad discretion is Guideline-based, while the Second Cir-
cuit's wide discretion seems to bear no resemblance to either the
Guideline policies or the Fifth Circuit's definition of broad discre-
tion. The result, at least in the Sixth Circuit, is a three-part test
ostensibly based upon the Guidelines, coupled with a form of discre-
tion described as broad, but possibly wide depending on which cir-
cuit's definition they ultimately accept.
After adopting the First Circuit's test in Rodriguez, the Sixth
Circuit returned to that test in United States v. Joan.44 The court
made reference to broad discretion and deferred to the trial judge's
ultimate familiarity with all the "nuances of the case.' 14 5 There was
a twist, however.
After applying the test to determine if a departure was war-
ranted and reasonable, the court added its own seven-part analysis to
determine reasonableness.' 4 The opinion indicates that the court
will apply the three-part test along with broad discretion (whatever
this means to the Sixth Circuit) to determine if there are grounds for
departure and if it is reasonable. 47 Then, to determine reasonable-
ness, the court will look at seven "guides":" 8 (1) the seriousness of
the defendant's past criminal conduct; (2) likelihood of recidivism;
(3) prior similar adult conduct that did not result in criminal convic-
tion; (4) previous lighter or lenient sentences; (5) what deterrent ef-
fect the sentence will have on future criminal conduct; (6) the neces-
sity of isolating the defendant from the community; and (7) the
length of time needed to achieve rehabilitation. 49
Several questions arise from this confusing decision. First, it is
unclear what test the court will apply in subsequent cases: a three-
part test? a seven-part test? or a ten-part, two-step test? Second, in
determining the reasonableness of a departure, what is the appropri-
ate measure of discretion: broad discretion? wide discretion? or some
variant of these terms? Finally, what does the Sixth Circuit's test
say that the Guidelines and the commentaries haven't already said?
143. United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1068 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1144 (1990).
144. 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 495-96.
146. Id. at 496.
147. Id. at 495.
148. Id. at 496. The court does not refer to these seven items as factors.
149. United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 1989).
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Upon review of the Sixth Circuit's seven-part test and the First
Circuit's three-part test, the author believes that an essential prob-
lem with both of these tests is that they are merely reiterations of
the Guideline policies and commentaries. For example, items one
and two of the seven-part analysis deal with past imprisonment and
recurrences of criminal conduct.' 50 Chapter four of the Guidelines,
Part A, 151 deals with criminal history. Specifically, section 4Al.1(a)
adds points to a calculation of criminal history for all prior imprison-
ments of more than one year and one month. 152 Section 4Al.1 also
accounts for misdemeanor imprisonments, miscellaneous imprison-
ments, and offenses committed while on probation or parole, super-
vised release, imprisonment, work release or escape status.153 In ad-
dition, recidivist behavior is accounted for by adding points for




The commentary to Part A shows that the Guidelines ade-
quately consider likelihood of rehabilitation and recidivism:
Introductory Commentary
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act sets forth four pur-
poses of sentencing. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).) A defend-
ant's record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant to those
purposes. A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior
is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dic-
tates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated crimi-
nal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each
recurrence. To protect the public from further crimes of the par-
ticular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future crimi-
nal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is
an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.
The specific factors included in § 4Al.1 and § 4A1.3 are
consistent with the extant empirical research assessing correlates
of recidivism and patterns of career criminal behavior. While
empirical research has shown that other factors are correlated
highly with the likelihood of recidivism, e.g., age and drug
abuse, for policy reasons they were not included here at this
time. The Commission has made no definitive judgment as to
the reliability of the existing data. However, the Commission
150. See text accompanying supra note 149.
151. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4.1-4.8.




will review additional data insofar as they become available in
the future. 55
Certainly, there may be cases when the Guidelines do not accu-
rately reflect conduct. Nevertheless, section 4B1.1-1.3 takes into ac-
count career offenders as well as criminal livelihood offenders. 156 A
seven-part analysis is not necessary since sentencing judges need only
determine whether or not the Guidelines adequately considered the
factors involved and, if so, whether these factors were substantially
in excess of the Guideline treatment of them. This can be accom-
plished by deferring to and discussing the commentaries and policy
statements.
D. Analysis from the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit's analysis of the departure issue comes closest
to reflecting the intentions of the Commission,' 57 and gives the great-
est recognition to those factors already incorporated into the Guide-
lines. In United States v. Uca,'58 the court of appeals reversed a
lower court for impermissibly departing in the sentences of two
defendants."5 9
The defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit federal
firearms offenses. 6 ' One defendant, Hodzic, had imported fifty-six
untraceable firearms into the Philadelphia area and intended to
transport them out of the United States.' The other defendant,
Uca, was involved in the attempted sale of the fifty-six firearms.6 2
The Guidelines calculated by the probation department called
for a range of between six to twelve months for Hodzic and two to
eight months for Uca.'6 3 However, based on the number of firearms
and its conclusion that "the conspiracy posed threats to community
safety and welfare," the probation department recommended much
stiffer sentences. 6" The court sentenced Hodzic to thirty months im-
155. Id.
156. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 4.9.
157. It appears from a case decided as recently as January 2, 1990, that the Fourth
Circuit's analysis of departures takes a similar approach to the Third Circuit by avoiding tests
and wide discretions and focusing primarily on the Guidelines and their commentaries. See
United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1990).
158. 867 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1989).
159. Id. at 784.
160. Id. at 785.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1989).
164. Id. The probation department recommended that Hodzic receive 24 months impris-
onment, three years supervised release, and $5000 in fines and that Uca receive 18 months in
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prisonment, three years supervised release, and $2250 in fines and
assessment, and Uca to the recommended sentence. 65 The lower
court cited the number of weapons and their inability to be traced as
reasons for its departure.""
The Third Circuit's response was to interpret the court's depar-
ture power in terms of limited discretion, especially when the Guide-
lines adequately consider the offense factors that the court used as
justification for departure.16 7 The court recognized the Commission's
stated intentions that departure should be rare. 6 8 This reasoning is
important because it is consistent with the stated intentions of Con-
prison, three years of supervised release, and $1050 in fines. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 786. The lower court's discussion of its reasons for departure is set forth
below:
The statutory maximum sentence on count I is five years' imprisonment.
The guideline range is 6 to 12 months. I am departing from the guideline range
and imposing a sentence of 30 months. Mr. Hodzic's offense and Mr. Hodzic
possessing 56 untraceable handguns poses a serious threat to the public safety
and welfare of the community. There's no lawful purpose for these guns. We're
not talking about one gun or two guns we're talking about 56 untraceable hand-
guns which translates in my mind to at least 56 potential acts of violence in this
country or another country. The use of handguns, unlicensed handguns, causes
the perpetuation of criminal activity of persons so inclined to rob, maim, start
their own private wars, even drug wars in cities such as Philadelphia.
I also find it difficult to understand why the defendants would not have had
some purpose in mind for these 56 weapons that could be articulated here today.
I'm departing from the guidelines upwards because of the threat posed to
the community by the defendant. As best I can surmise, and taking the evidence
in the light most favorable to the defendant, he was involved in the attempted
sale of 56 handguns to an Albanian for overseas use, an illegal use which would
have required transport outside of the country.
On the other hand, according to the defendant there was no clear purpose,
which translates into an undefined purpose which means that these untraceable
guns had a market value in this country or elsewhere precisely because they
were untraceable.
United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted). In response to a
question by Uca's counsel, the sentencing court elaborated:
I do not find that the guidelines are adequate to address an issue of in-
tended sale of handguns for an overseas war, small or large. I do not find the
guidelines speak to the characteristic of guns being untraceable. I do not find the
guidelines speak to the characteristics of the offense, including handguns-well,
that are not traceable.
It is the quality of that offense which prompts me to depart from the guide-
lines. The guidelines are guidelines, I exercise my discretion in departing from
them and for the reasons given.
id.
167. "[W]hen the applicable guidelines, specific offense characteristics and adjustments
do take into consideration a factor listed ... , departure from the guideline is warranted only
if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in
the offense of conviction." Id. (emphasis added). See also, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note
6, at 5.35-5.40 (Chapter 5, Part K).
168. United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1989).
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gress to impose uniformity of sentencing for similar actions through-
out the country. 169 In order to accomplish this goal of uniformity, it
is necessary to limit departure. As the Third Circuit recognized,
"These attempts to impose uniformity will be destroyed if courts
often depart from the Guidelines. "170
Accordingly, the Third Circuit's review concentrated on the
guideline factors17' and whether those factors had already ade-
quately considered the conduct cited by the sentencing judge as jus-
tification for departure. 172 The bulk of the discussion in Uca was an
analysis of each factor the lower court used to depart and the rela-
tionship of those factors to the applicable Guidelines. When the
Guideline covers the conduct in question the analysis is complete:
any departure is unwarranted and would be considered unreasona-
ble. Departure is appropriate in only two situations: when a case in-
volves characteristics not covered by the Guidelines, or when the
characteristics in the case, although considered by the Guidelines,
are substantially in excess of the usual case.
The Third Circuit's approach to interpreting the guidelines is
the most sensible considering the stated intention of the Commission.
Although departures will be rare under this approach, they will still
be possible. Broad discretion, wide discretion, or some other test or
standard is not necessary to allow for departure. The Third Circuit's
approach is one example of how a court may depart within the
bounds of the Guideline commentaries and policy statements.
In another Third Circuit case, United States v. Ryan, 73 the de-
fendant was charged with one count of possession with intent to dis-
tribute crack cocaine 74 to which he pled not guilty and went to
trial. 75 The jury acquitted him of that charge but found him guilty
of the lesser included offense of simple possession. 76
During trial, evidence was adduced that while the defendant
was being apprehended, he dropped a brown paper bag that was
later retrieved and found to contain thirty-three plastic bags each
with between .2 and .4 grams of crack cocaine, totalling 10.32
169. See supra note 6.
170. Uca, 867 F.2d at 787.
171. "Thus, in exercising our review function on the question of whether the Commis-
sion adequately took certain factors in consideration, this court should respect the overriding
congressional purpose of reducing sentencing disparity and achieving general uniformity of
treatment." Id.
172. See United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787-90 (3d Cir. 1989).
173. 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989).
174. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
175. Ryan, 866 F.2d at 605.
176. Id. The statute for possession is 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1982).
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grams.177 The purity of the crack was ninety percent by weight.178
One of the officers testified that based upon his experience in drug
enforcement, the possession of such a large number of packets indi-
cated that the crack was not for personal use but was for sale.
1 9
The presentence report calculated a Guideline range of between
zero and six months. 180 The judge, however, chose to depart and sen-
tenced the defendant to ten months in prison, one year supervised
release, and $525 in fines.' 8' The sentencing court based its depar-
ture on the amount of drugs (more than ten grams), the purity, and
the packaging, factors that the court felt were not addressed in the
Guidelines. 8" On appeal, the defendant argued that the Commission
chose not to use quantity as a factor in cases of simple possession, in
contrast to the offenses of possession with intent to distribute or traf-
ficking, in which the base offense levels do depend upon quantity. 183
A similar argument was made regarding the purity of the drug.
8 4
The Third Circuit analyzed the sentencing court's decision in
the same way it did in Uca, but reached the conclusion that depar-
ture was warranted. 8 ' The court's analysis was detailed and relied
heavily on the original Commission commentaries as well as updates
that deal with the exact subject of this case:.
The Government further notes that in its first "update" on
guideline issues, dated May 5, 1988, the Commission addressed
the following inquiry: "[i]f the offender is indicted for possession
with intent to distribute, but is only convicted of simple posses-
sion, does the amount of drugs affect the sentence?" The Com-
mission responded:
The guideline section utilized to compute the guideline
range must be determined by the offense of conviction (§ 1B1
2(a)). The simple possession guideline (§2D2.1) does not utilize
the amount of drugs to determine the appropriate offense level.
Of course, the amount of drugs may be considered by the court
for the purposes of determining the appropriate sentence within
the guideline range and/or possible departure.88





182. United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 605 (3d Cir. 1989).
183. Id. at 606.
184. Id. The Guidelines do note that unusually high purity may be a reason for upward
departure, but this is not in the possession section. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 6, at 2.33
(§ 2D1.1 (Commentary)).
185. Ryan, 866 F.2d at 610.
186. Id. at 608 n.8.
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The court also noted that Congress' recent recognition of crack
cocaine as a dangerous drug187 made this case unusual, especially
because of the quantity and purity of the drugs.188 The crux of the
analysis and the reliance upon the commentaries and Commission's
judgment are evident from the final paragraph of the opinion.
Exercising plenary review, we have determined that a de-
parture is legally permissible because the Commission did not
take into account the aggravating circumstances in this case. Be-
yond that determination, we still must decide whether the given
departure was reasonable. That involves at least two sub-issues:
whether the factors relied on are appropriate; and whether the
degree of departure was appropriate. We conclude, in light of
the general language in the guidelines indicating that if depar-
ture is authorized, the district courts are entitled to exercise a
substantial amount of discretion in determining whether to de-
part from the guidelines; ihe more specific language suggesting
that particular factors relied on by the district court in this case
may well have been viewed by the Commission as warranting
departure; and the failure of the Commission to preclude depar-
ture on the grounds here relied upon, that the district court's
departure from the guidelines in this case was not unreasonable.
We will, therefore, affirm.' 89
The Third Circuit's reliance on the Commission's judgment is signif-
icant, especially in light of the minimal consideration given to these
policies by the other circuits. The Guidelines, as written, allow for
flexibility on their own terms. A court need not go outside those
terms to find reasons to act.
V. Problems in Deciding Departure Issues
The patterns of analysis that have been discussed suggest con-
flict among the circuits, conflict that would usually provide ample
reason for the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari for
resolution. As of the writing of this Article, however, the Court had
three opportunities to examine these cases and denied certiorari in
all three.'90
187. This was done when Congress recently amended 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) to penalize
possession of crack cocaine.
188. United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989).
189. Id. at 610.
190. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
177 (1989); United States v. Velasquez-Mercado, 872 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 187 (1989); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
175 (1989).
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In addition, the court recently denied certiorari in a fourth de-
parture case, United States v. Taylor.191 In that case, however, Jus-
tice Stevens challenged the Fifth Circuit for their failure to identify
an inter-circuit conflict on the question of departures that could have
been resolved.192 His opinion, though not altogether clear on the is-
sue, seems to signal a willingness to act should the right case arise:
Because the petition does not identify any inter-Circuit con-
flict concerning the question presented, and because the answer
provided by the Fifth Circuit's published opinion is widely sup-
ported, the Court's denial of certiorari today is entirely consis-
tent with rules governing the management of our certiorari
docket. It is unfortunate that the summary disposition of peti-
tioner's case by the Fifth Circuit and this Court may require
petitioner to serve an 18-month prison sentence when the Guide-
lines would specify a range between only 9 and 15 months even
if petitioner's criminal history category were increased two full
levels. That, however, is the kind of burden that the individual
litigant must occasionally bear when efficient management is
permitted to displace the careful administration of justice in
each case. Perhaps it is not too late for the Court of Appeals to
exercise additional care in the administration of justice in this
case.
93
It is not clear why the Court has refused to hear the cases.
There are, however, several problems that the Court would face in
deciding departure issues. Several of these problems are discussed
below.
A. Who Decides?
One fundamental question is who is to decide which standard
best suits the intention of the Commissioners and maintains the in-
tegrity of the Guidelines, its accompanying commentaries, and policy
statements. Presumably, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction since
these cases are from lower federal courts1" and deal with federal
191. 873 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.)(Table), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 265, withdrawn, 889 F.2d
272 (5th Cir. 1989) (vacating district court opinion). If the withdrawal of this opinion means
anything, this author believes it may mean that either this circuit or other circuits who are
internally in conflict over Guideline interpretation may consider certifying those conflicts. Cer-
tainly Justice Stevens has given a signal that there is some desire on the Court's part to review
the right case. Perhaps the careful exercise of judicial administration in the Fifth Circuit will
mean that Taylor will soon be before the Court.
192. 110 S. Ct. at 265 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
193. Id. at 265-66.
194. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § B; see also 23 U.S.C. § 1254 (1966).
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legislation. That answer may be deceptively simple, however, since
the Commission is a continuing, independent body still extant. 195 Its
members serve for designated terms and are obligated to periodically
review and revise the Guidelines. 19 Since it operates under the judi-
cial branch, the Commission has a somewhat judicial function. Any
new amendments or revisions, however, must be reported to Con-
gress 197 and Congress must be given a yearly analysis of the Guide-
line operations. 9 8
It is also the Commission's task to monitor the performance of
probation officers and judicial and probation personnel,199 as well as
perform other functions necessary to assist courts in meeting their
responsibilities. 00 It is unclear whether these functions include alter-
ing commentaries and policy statements to correct the inconsisten-
cies among the circuits. If this is part of the Commission's role, are
the alterations it makes binding on litigants and the courts? An ad-
ditional question is whether the Supreme Court must or should allow
the Commission an opportunity to correct problems with the Guide-
lines before the Court takes a case for decision.2"' If the Supreme
Court decided an issue contrary to written commentaries or policies
(if indeed it can), could the Commission overrule the Court by clari-
fying, changing, or promulgating a new Guideline, similar to Con-
gress' power to overrule a Supreme court precedent by legislation?
If the monitoring, 201 no matter how burdensome, is carried out
and the intention of the Commission is defeated and if disparities in
sentencing continue, who acts, the Commission or the courts? The
majority opinion in Mistretta v. United States0 s seems to answer
this by indicating that the Commission has no authority to exercise
judicial power.20 4 If this is so, one must question the propriety of the
195. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. 1987).
196. Id. § 994(o). The Commission has recently made revisions to correct or clarify the
operation of the Guidelines. See supra notes 36, 38.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (p) (Supp. 1987).
198. Id. § 994(w).
199. Id. § 995(a)(9).
200. Id. § 995(a)(22).
201. Put another way, is there a heretofore unknown administrative remedy that liti-
gants must exhaust or wait for it to be exhausted by its own process before they can avail
themselves of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
202. "We note, in passing, that the monitoring function is not without its burden. Every
year, with respect to each of more than 40,000 sentences, the federal courts must forward, and
the Commission must review, the presentence report, the guideline worksheets, the tribunal's
sentencing statement, and any written plea agreement." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647, 653 (1989).
203. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
204. Regarding the Commission's location with the structure of the federal government
the Court noted:
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Commission's commentaries being controlling in courts' interpreta-
tion of the Guidelines. Finally (and we've come full circle), it is un-
clear what happens when an appeals court interprets the Guidelines
too liberally or too restrictively. Perhaps Justice Scalia's assessment
in Mistretta is correct: "[H]ere we have an anomaly beyond equal:
an independent agency exercising governmental power on behalf of a
Branch where all governmental power is supposed to be exercised
personally by the judges of courts."2"5
B. Are New Rights Created?
Since the Commission has the authority to set a sentence and,
except in all but the most atypical and substantially aggravating
cases, mandate what Guideline is to be followed,2"6 does this create a
standard by which we can now measure when a sentence involves the
eighth amendment? In other words, can a court now analyze
whether a sentence is cruel and unusual by using the Guidelines?
Since the basic idea of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is proportionality 07 in light of the crime, do the Guide-
lines now set a standard for review of that question? If a sentence
far exceeds the Guideline, can it be unconstitutional as well as
unreasonable?
VI. Conclusion
In order to achieve the Guidelines' purpose of attaining truth-
fulness and uniformity in sentencing, the Commission's intention
must indeed be upheld. It is apparent that some circuits are not up-
holding the intentions of the Commission. This author believes that
disparity in sentences may be the result.20 ' If all the circuits ana-
lyzed departure issues as the Third Circuit has, there would be mini-
mal problems. Unfortunately, this is not the current trend.
The Sentencing Commission unquestionably is a peculiar institution within
the framework of our Government. Although placed by the Act in the Judicial
Branch, it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, the Com-
mission is an "independent" body comprised of seven voting members including
at least three federal judges, entrusted by Congress with the primary task of
promulgating sentencing guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
Id. at 661.
205. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
206. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
207. See Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).
208. This author predicts that if and when statistical studies are released, they will show
that the uniformity of sentencing goal has been realized by application of the Guidelines.
However, this author believes that uniformity will be thwarted by the divergent methodologies
now employed in interpreting the Guidelines.
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The cases decided in several circuits, however, indicate that the
Guidelines may be useful to predict sentencing only when a judge
wants them to be. In other words, without a reasonable, workable
method by which to determine when and how much to depart (espe-
cially upward), courts will frequently depart from the Guidelines,
and by substantial amounts. But should the independent agency or
the courts solve the problem? The Congress and the Commission
should act quickly to answer such questions. Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court may need to accept certiorari in an appropriate case to
provide guidance after Mistretta.

